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Article
Overseeing Oversight
MICHAEL KARANICOLAS & MARGARET B. KWOKA
Accountability is at the core of democratic governance. In the United States, the
administrative state is formally situated within the executive branch, but the unelected
nature of agency officials, combined with the vast power they wield, has long been cause
for concern. A crucial tool for establishing accountability within this so-called “Fourth
Branch” is the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which provides ordinary members
of the public with a mechanism for direct oversight of how administrative agencies
function. Similar right-to-information laws have been implemented in over one hundred
countries. However, in contrast to most of its international counterparts, the FOIA
system is severely undermined by its own lack of institutional oversight. Apart from the
rare case that makes it to court, agency decisions against releasing records to the public
generally are not subject to meaningful review.
While there has been no shortage of scholarship documenting the practical
challenges with FOIA, this Article is the first to connect these problems to the
institutional design choice at the root of FOIA’s oversight deficit. The Article traces the
history of FOIA, including the most recent reforms that introduced a FOIA ombudsman
office, and documents how the remedies for agency recalcitrance are inadequate to
protect the public’s right to information. It then presents a comparative survey of global
right-to-information models to pinpoint precisely what design aspects are essential to
an effective oversight regime. It argues that the strongest models rely on an independent
administrative body, such as an information commission, which is located outside of the
executive branch entirely and has the power to order administrative agencies to release
records when the commission’s review results in a conclusion that withholding is
unjustified under the law.
At a time when abuses of executive power have jolted the nation’s collective
consciousness, and when the United States’ democratic institutions have faced their
most serious threat since the Civil War, there is enormous urgency to improve our
mechanisms for democratic oversight, namely through developing oversight of these
very structures. This Article documents the democratic deficit underlying our current
FOIA remedies and analyzes better institutional design alternatives.
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Overseeing Oversight
MICHAEL KARANICOLAS *
& MARGARET B. KWOKA **
INTRODUCTION
On July 21, 2021, Ghana’s newly created Right to Information
Commission released its first ever judgment, ordering the country’s mining
regulator to reduce its cost estimate for a journalist’s document request from
around USD $1,000 to less than $1 and to deliver the information within
fourteen days.1 The entire complaint process took just over one month.2
While the judgment represented an important milestone for Ghana’s
relatively young democracy, stories like this happen every day around the
world and, for the most part, are a relatively unremarkable feature of
well-functioning right-to-information systems.
Indeed, in all modern democracies, freedom of information or
right-to-information legislation3 is a core mechanism for direct public
accountability over administrative institutions, allowing members of the
public to obtain a direct and unvarnished view of how these institutions
operate through access to government documents, subject to enumerated
exemptions.4 However, a curious feature of the right to information, in
contrast to other democratic indicators, is that the strongest legal frameworks
for guaranteeing public access to information tend to be enacted in emerging

*

Executive Director, UCLA Institute for Technology, Law & Policy.
Lawrence Herman Professor in Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. The
authors would like to thank Lisa Austin, Cinnamon Carlarne, Bryan Choi, Ruth Colker, David Cuillier,
Ned Foley, César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Ari Glogower, RonNell Anderson Jones, Helen
Norton, Scott Skinner-Thompson, Stanley Tromp, Catherine Tully, and Chris Walker for their helpful
feedback and commentary.
1
Ghana’s Information Commission Orders Release of Information to Journalist at $0.33 Instead of
$1,000 Demanded by State Agency, MEDIA FOUND. FOR W. AFR. (July 21, 2021), https://www.mfwa.org/
ghana-information-commission-orders-release-of-information-to-journalist-at-0-33-instead-of-1000-dema
nded-by-state-agency/.
2
Id.
3
The majority of countries around the world now refer to such laws as protecting “the right to
information,” rather than “freedom of information” or “access to information,” concomitant with growing
global recognition of access to official documents as a constitutional right. See MICHAEL KARANICOLAS
& TOBY MENDEL, CENTRE FOR L. & DEMOCRACY, ENTRENCHING RTI: CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
OF THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION (Mar. 2012), www.law-democracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/
Const-Report-with-Annex.pdf (providing a broader discussion of the progressive recognition of a
constitutional right to information).
4
What Is FOIA?, FOIA.GOV, https://www.foia.gov/about.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2022).
**
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democracies. One potential explanation for this phenomenon is that countries
with a recent experience of dictatorship have an intuitive understanding of the
importance of formal public accountability mechanisms and are less likely to
take their democracy for granted.
By contrast, one of the first right-to-information laws in the world was
the U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).6 FOIA can be a powerful tool
of accountability, but the efficacy of this system is heavily dependent on its
implementation and, ultimately, on the oversight of the FOIA system itself.
In this regard, FOIA is woefully behind. It relies on judicial oversight to
police agencies’ obligations—a cumbersome, expensive, and lengthy
process that is scantly utilized.
Oversight of transparency obligations is crucial because, while the public
interest weighs heavily in favor of a well-resourced and effective right of
access, agencies and their political leadership often have interests in keeping
documents hidden from the public eye, particularly where the disclosures
might be embarrassing.7 Even when decisions are made by career staff in
FOIA offices, institutional interests of the agency can consciously or
unconsciously bias decision-making in favor of over-withholding records
from the public.
This Article argues in support of FOIA’s utility as a core mechanism of
public oversight for the executive branch, but it asserts that this function is
stymied due to a lack of meaningful oversight of the FOIA system itself.
Even the most ambitious and progressive right-to-information framework
will be meaningless in the absence of an effective system for guaranteeing
that officials actually comply with it.8 Although Congress has attempted to
strengthen FOIA oversight—most notably by creating the Office of
Government Information Services in 20079—its efforts have fallen short of
the necessary independence and authority needed to be effective.

5

See Country Data: By Country, GLOB. RIGHT TO INFO. RATING, https://www.rtirating.org/country-data (last visited Mar. 19, 2022). All of the top twenty scoring countries on the Right
to Information (RTI) Rating are relatively new democracies. However, an important caveat to this is that
the RTI Rating measures only the strength of a country’s law as written, and it does not consider how
robustly it has been implemented. However, the tendency among emerging democracies to pass stronger
legislation is itself noteworthy, even if broader rule of law challenges can, in some cases, lead to
structures that only exist on paper.
6
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A)-(D), (b).
7
Rebecca Beitsch, Watchdog Report Raises New Questions for Top Interior Lawyer, HILL (Aug.
11, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/511342-watchdog-report-raisesnew-questions-for-top-interior-lawyer.
8
TOBY MENDEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL SURVEY 37–38 (2d ed.
2008).
9
Office of Government Information Services, 81 Fed. Reg. 95,547 (proposed Dec. 28, 2016) (to be
codified at 36 C.F.R. ch. 7).
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The recent reforms also fall short of models that have been implemented
around the world, from Canada to Afghanistan.10 Through a comparative
analysis of freedom of information and right-to-information systems around
the world, this Article demonstrates that, although the United States was
among the first countries to adopt freedom of information legislation, it now
lags behind much of the world in terms of how the FOIA system is overseen.
In most progressive democracies, this oversight is often channeled through
a politically independent administrative body, which has the power to review
agency disclosure decisions and order recalcitrant agencies to comply with
the law.11 By contrast, the United States requires a dissatisfied requester to
appeal an information denial to the very same agency that denied the
request.12 If this process proves fruitless, the requester’s only option to
compel compliance is through a federal lawsuit, which is time consuming,
expensive, and difficult to navigate without legal representation.13
Part I of this Article documents the critical role of the right to information
in a modern democracy. Using data from a series of original interviews with
journalists, it highlights the core areas in which reporters use the law to keep
executive agencies in check, including misconduct of officials, influence over
agency decision-making, and national security and law enforcement powers.
In a landscape of increasing concern about unchecked executive power, Part I
describes the critical role of access to agency information in keeping the
executive branch accountable. It particularly highlights the central role of
journalists, both as a primary constituency that Congress imagined FOIA to
serve and as critical users of the law today in uncovering government
documents important to public accountability.
Part II assesses Congress’s institutional design choices when it passed
FOIA initially, as well as small shifts it has made over time through
amendments. It documents how Congress’s vision for judicial review as the
primary mechanism for overseeing agency FOIA decisions has failed to
effectively police executive secrecy or provide meaningful redress for
frustrated requesters, using journalists’ experiences as a benchmark for
measuring how FOIA oversight operates. Moreover, its recent shift toward
an ombudsman model has not done nearly enough to bridge the gap, leaving
agencies as the last decisionmakers in the overwhelming majority of cases
regarding which of their records are released. This has created a system that
naturally favors excessive secrecy.

10

Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c A-1 (Can.); Access to Information Law, 2014, ch. 1,
arts. 1–2 (Afg.).
11
See infra Part III.
12
OIP Guidance: Adjudicating Administrative Appeals Under the FOIA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/oip/oipguidance/Adjudicating%20Administrative%20Appeals%20Under%20the%20FOIA (Aug. 12, 2021).
13
See infra Part II.B.
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Part III provides a broad comparative analysis of the different models of
oversight in force around the world, paying particular attention to our nearest
neighbors, with an in-depth analysis of institutional design choices in Canada
and Mexico.
This comparative approach forms the basis for Part IV, which analyzes
the strengths and weaknesses of the different systems. We argue that the most
effective information oversight bodies share two key features. First, they are
as fully independent of and protected from political influences as can be.
Second, they possess what we call “order making power”—that is, the power
to review individual decisions to withhold information and to issue binding
orders requiring agencies to release information when mandated by law. The
Article concludes by suggesting that an independent information commission
with order-making power is fully feasible in the U.S. legal context, consistent
with the design of other non-Article III adjudication and the separation of
powers concerns that militate toward greater oversight of executive agencies.
I. FOIA AS A CHECK ON EXECUTIVE POWER
Accountability is at the heart of the modern representative democracy.
The very notion of a democratic republic, stemming from Enlightenment-era
political philosophers, is founded on the people knowing enough about what
their elected officials are doing to vote them in or out of office accordingly.14
The earliest transparency law, which dates back to the eighteenth century, is
rooted in this enlightenment mentality.15
The United States was the third country in the world to adopt
right-to-know legislation, embodied in the Freedom of Information Act.
Enacted in 1966, FOIA created a unique accountability mechanism, giving
the right of access directly to the people. Despite the broad drafting,
however, journalists in particular were seen as crucial information
intermediaries, thought to uncover government information and publicize it
for the populace to act upon. As such, journalists’ experiences using the law
can act as a benchmark for understanding how FOIA now falls short
compared to right-to-know regimes later enacted around the world.
A. The Theory of FOIA
Despite the foundational nature of accurate information to a well-functioning
democracy, the United States did not see a need for legal protections for
14
See MARGARET B. KWOKA, SAVING THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 12–15 (2021)
(documenting the link between the development of modern democracies and the focus on government
transparency).
15
Juha Manninen, Anders Chydenius and the Origins of World’s First Freedom of Information Act,
in THE WORLD’S FIRST FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: ANDERS CHYDENIUS’ LEGACY TODAY 18, 18–
19 (Juha Mustonen ed., 2006).
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access to government information until the growth of the administrative state
associated with the New Deal in the 1930s. As one scholar put it, “[a]n
avalanche of new federal agencies and commissions—including the
National Recovery Administration, the NLRB, and the SEC—reached ever
more broadly into a free market that appeared to have failed,” and the
number of federal agencies doubled in this short period of time.16 Initially,
the Supreme Court was reigning in agency power with aggressive judicial
review of congressionally approved programs, invalidating vast swaths of
agency actions.17 But, after Roosevelt’s so-called court packing plan to add
Justices to the Court, the Court reversed course and began upholding broad
agency authority.18
The Court’s decision to stop standing in the way of New Deal programs
was a watershed moment in the growth of the administrative state, and it
gave rise to a growing challenge in how to impose accountability over the
sprawling applications of executive power. Over the years, academics,
policymakers, and the courts have struggled with the mechanisms for agency
accountability. Some envision accountability as flowing from the President,
who remains ultimately accountable to the electorate. Some envision a
greater role for Congressional oversight. And some envision a stronger role
for judicial supervisions.
For example, on the presidential control side, then-Professor Elena
Kagan has celebrated the rise of what she called the “presidential
administration,” where the President is more actively involved in setting
agency policymaking agenda, citing accountability as one of its key
benefits.19 In the same vein, the Courts have struck down limits on
presidential control over independent agencies, most recently declaring that
agency officials’ authority “remains subject to the ongoing supervision and
control of the elected President.”20 An even more extreme case for
presidential control over agencies has been dubbed the unitary executive
theory, under which Congress would be prohibited from crafting agencies
as independent from the President and any restrictions on presidential
removal of agency heads would be invalid.21
On the congressional side, legislation has long experimented with
mechanisms for greater control by Congress over agency actions. One
attempt—the legislative veto—was a mechanism for Congress to invalidate
16

George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New
Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1561–62 (1996).
17
Id. at 1644.
18
Id. at 1563.
19
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331 (2001).
20
Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2203 (2020).
21
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unitary Executive: Past, Present, Future,
2020 SUP. CT. REV. 83, 83–84 (articulating a “unitary executive” theory of the presidency, in which the
President exercises complete control over agencies).
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agency actions with less formal action than passing new legislation. While
it was ultimately declared unconstitutional, the Congressional Review Act
took its place as a mechanism for agency reporting about significant
regulatory actions and for allowing Congress to fast-track legislation to
overturn such rules that it deems unwise.23
On the judicial side, anxiety about concentrated and unchecked agency
power has animated debates over the future of various deference doctrines
that currently pervade administrative law. For example, Justices Kavanaugh
and Gorsuch have called into question the future of the Chevron deference
doctrine, under which courts must defer to agencies reasonable
interpretations of statutes they administer. As one scholar described, “[t]he
Chevron doctrine has greatly empowered administrative agencies to recast
the law in accord with current policy preferences, without having to go to
Congress for legislative change.”24
If anything, the Trump administration increased the stakes of this debate.
As one scholar described, “Trump’s approach to governance has alarmed
legal scholars across the political spectrum” and might militate toward an
increased role for judicial review, rather than for presidential control over
agencies.25 Public debate about executive accountability may have reached
its apex during this time.26
At the time of the New Deal, when concerns about concentration of
executive power in unaccountable agencies first came into the fore, one
answer was Congress’s adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
which created foundational procedural requirements for agency actions and
regularized judicial review of those actions.27 Tellingly, the original version
of the APA contained the first attempt at a right-to-information provision.28

22

Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 923 (1983).
See Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–08 (creating the
congressional review process).
24
Michael McConnell, Kavanaugh and the “Chevron Doctrine”, HOOVER INST. (July 30, 2018),
https://www.hoover.org/research/kavanaugh-and-chevron-doctrine.
25
Daniel A. Farber, Presidential Administration Under Trump (Aug. 8, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3015591).
26
See Richard Blumenthal, Opinion, Richard Blumenthal: GOP Must Address Trump’s Attacks on
Courts, HARTFORD COURANT (Feb. 8, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.courant.com/opinion/op-ed/hc-opblumenthal-trump-attack-on-courts-gop-0208-20170207-story.html (“Numerous reports indicate that
U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials across the country have failed to enforce federal court
orders blocking President Trump's recent executive orders.”); George. F. Will, Opinion, A Judicial
Rebuke for a Heedless Congress?, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/a-judicial-rebuke-for-a-heedless-congress/2020/02/27/a03527fa-5986-11ea-9b35-def5a027d4
70_story.html (“Testifying in 2018 to the House Financial Services Committee, the [Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau]’s acting director said his agency is ‘not accountable to you. It’s not accountable to
the public. It’s not accountable to anybody but itself’ . . . .”).
27
See generally Shepherd, supra note 16, at 1558-61 (describing the legislative history of the APA).
28
S. REP. NO. 88-1219, at 10 (1964).
23
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Information access was seen as one integral part of reigning in executive power.
While that provision proved ineffective, it paved the way for FOIA reforms.
In 1966, Congress passed FOIA, making it only the third country to codify
a right of access to public records. The need for information access rights was
codified as part of the APA, and its accountability aims were explicit.
President Johnson, when signing the bill into law, declared that “the United
States is an open society in which the people’s right to know is cherished and
guarded.”29 Shortly after important amendments to the law, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed FOIA’s central role in promoting accountability and
oversight, stating that it “ensure[s] an informed citizenry, vital to the
functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and
to hold the governors accountable to the governed.”30 One set of scholars even
asserted that “quality of responses to identical FOIA requests provides one
measure of agencies’ democratic accountability.”31 That is, FOIA both
facilitates accountability and can even define whether it exists.
While the political and legal context of FOIA in the United States differs
from the context of right-to-information regimes in other countries, the link
between transparency and accountability is consistent across the globe.
Globally, the right to information only gained traction over the past thirty
years.32 In 1990, only fourteen countries had adopted access to information
laws.33 As of January 2022, 129 countries comprising over eighty percent of
the world’s population had such laws in place.34 Over the same time period,
the right to access information became entrenched in international human
rights law through decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights35
and the European Court of Human Rights,36 as well as through the United

29
Statement by the President upon Signing the Freedom of Information Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 699
(July 4, 1966).
30
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).
31
David E. Lewis & Abby K. Wood, Judicial Deference and Agency Accountability: A Federal
FOIA Experiment 10 (2011) (unpublished manuscript), https://my.vanderbilt.edu/davidlewis/files/2011
/12/lewis-and-wood-paper-v.9.pdf.
32
Country Data: By Country, supra note 5.
33
Id.
34
Id.; see also Countries in the World by Population (2022), WORLDOMETER (last visited Apr. 16,
2022) (indicating that of the top fifty countries by population, only Egypt, Congo, Algeria, Myanmar,
Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia don't have RTI laws; the percentages of the remaining top fifty countries
by population add up to more than eighty percent).
35
See, e.g., Claude-Reyes v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Order, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 151 (Sept. 19, 2006) (holding that Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights protects
the right of all individuals to request access to State-held information, and that the information should be
provided without the need to prove direct interest or personal involvement in order to obtain it).
36
See generally Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, App. No. 37374/05 (Apr. 14, 2009),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-9217 (holding that a government creating obstacles that prevented
access to readily available information effectively counted as a form of censorship in violation of Article
10 of the ECHR).
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Nations Human Rights Committee’s 2011 General Comment on Article 19
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.37
Along with the spread of right-to-information legislation, there has been
a growing recognition of the benefits of granting the public a broad right of
access. Chief among these is that these mechanisms support democratic
engagement, just like the evident animating purpose behind FOIA.
Democracy depends on having an informed electorate, entrusted with
decision-making power over key public policy questions. This includes both
voting for leaders, whose campaign platforms align with their own priorities,
and public participation in referendums and consultative exercises. Direct
access to government information gives the public an unfiltered picture of
what is going on, which allows them to exercise this responsibility in an
informed and effective way.38
More broadly, the essence of democratic accountability is that members
of the public have a right to scrutinize the actions of their leaders and to
assess government performance. Placing information into the public realm is
a component of this critical task, which facilitates direct public oversight over
the mechanisms of government. It also helps to promote trust in public
institutions and improve relations between citizens and the government.39 In
particular, formal structures to share accurate information can be instrumental
in combating rumor and misinformation.40
The right to information is also useful to promoting accountability by, for
example, exposing waste, mismanagement, and corruption. Around the world,
legislation that empowers a right of access is a critical tool among investigative
journalists, civil society, and even opposition politicians in exposing mistakes
by those in power. There is no shortage of examples of information requests
being directly instrumental in exposing government malpractice.41
37

See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 34: Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and
Expression, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011).
38
See Nat’l Archives & Recs. Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 147, 171–72 (2004) (“FOIA is often
explained as a means for citizens to know ‘what their Government is up to.’ This phrase should not be
dismissed as a convenient formalism. It defines a structural necessity in a real democracy.”) (citation
omitted).
39
See Maria Cucciniello & Greta Nasi, Transparency for Trust in Government: How Effective Is
Formal Transparency?, 37 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 911, 911 (2014) (mapping the relationship between
transparency, trust and government accountability). But see David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information
Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1131–36 (2017) (arguing that FOIA
contributes to the public’s disillusionment with the competency of the administrative state by revealing
exceptional instances of failure in an otherwise well-functioning bureaucracy and by itself not being
administrable and providing the public with an experience of bureaucratic failure).
40
For example, a central aspect of the Canadian government’s response to the threat of election
interference via misinformation has been to boost transparency rules in the Canada Elections Act. See
Elections Modernization Act, S.C. 2018, c. 31.
41
See, e.g., Anna Clark, How an Investigative Journalist Helped Prove a City Was Being Poisoned
with Its Own Water, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.cjr.org/united_states_projec
t/flint_water_lead_curt_guyette_aclu_michigan.php (using freedom of information requests to document
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B. The Unique Role of Journalist Requesters
Journalists are particularly prolific stakeholders of right-to-information
laws. Not only was the role of the news media central to Congress’s
conception of how FOIA would operate to inform the public, but journalism
organizations and reporters remain advocates for transparency laws in a
variety of fora. Perhaps most importantly, reporters routinely use the law to
good effect in ways that precisely implicate accountability over executive
agency exercises of power. Their experiences, therefore, show both the
potential and the current limitations of FOIA’s promise.
Original interviews one of us conducted with journalists demonstrate
three thematic categories of use, which directly align with FOIA’s
accountability aims.42 First, American journalists use FOIA to uncover
government waste and misconduct. For example, Kevin Bogardus at E&E
News used FOIA to get documents that showed how much Scott Pruitt’s
extra (and unjustified) security detail cost the taxpayer, one of a collection
of problems Pruitt faced while in office that led him to resign from his
position as Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).43
In fact, another group of researchers who examined newspaper stories over
a year-long period found that twenty-five percent of stories that reference
FOIA concern government incompetence or wrongdoing.44 These uses of
FOIA go to the heart of government accountability.
Second, reporters routinely use FOIA to try to understand what kind of
influence might have impacted government decision-making, such as
private industries, lobbyists, interest groups, or political motivations. For
example, Justin Elliott at ProPublica used FOIA to break the first story
linking the request from the Justice Department for a citizenship question on
the census to a political appointee, suggesting a political motivation rather
than the bureaucratic reasoning officially cited.45 Other frequent types of
the government’s role in Flint, Michigan’s water crisis); Phlis McGregor & Angela MacIvor, Black
People 3 Times More Likely to Be Street Checked in Halifax, Police Say, CBC, https://www.cbc.ca/new
s/canada/nova-scotia/halifax-black-street-checks-police-race-profiling-1.3925251(Jan. 9, 2017) (noting
where freedom of information requests were used to document racist policing policies in Canada).
42
KWOKA, supra note 14, at 178–79.
43
Telephone Interview by Margaret B. Kwoka with Kevin Bogardus, Reporter, E&E News (Mar.
22, 2019); KWOKA, supra note 14, at 37-39, 38 n.33; Kevin Bogardus, Big Spike in Security Spending
for Pruitt, E&E NEWS (July 5, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://eenews.net/articles/big-spike-in-securityspending-for-pruitt/.
44
Bruce E. Cain, Patrick Egan & Sergio Fabbrini, Towards More Open Democracies: The
Expansion of Freedom of Information Laws, in DEMOCRACY TRANSFORMED?: EXPANDING POLITICAL
OPPORTUNITIES IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES 115, 136 (Bruce E. Cain, Russell J. Dalton &
Susan E. Scarrow eds., 2003).
45
Telephone Interview by Margaret B. Kwoka with Justin Elliott, Reporter, ProPublica (Apr. 19,
2019); KWOKA, supra note 14, at 41-42; Justin Elliott, The Trump Appointee Behind the Move to Add a
Citizenship Question to the Census, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 7, 2018, 5:10 PM), https://www.propublica.org
/article/john-gore-trump-appointee-citizenship-question-census.
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requests along these lines are government officials’ calendars, agency visitor
logs, and other documents that tend to show who officials were meeting with
prior to important decisions.46
Finally, many journalists covering law enforcement and national security
matters—matters where the government wields its most coercive powers—use
FOIA routinely. This area is somewhat more complex because, as is frequently
the subject of commentary, the law enforcement and national security
exemptions to disclosure are so broad that FOIA may appear less powerful in
these realms.47 Nonetheless, the law can be effective in supporting journalism
in this space. For instance, the most frequent plaintiff in FOIA cases brought by
The New York Times is Charlie Savage, a national security reporter.48 And other
journalists explained how FOIA can often uncover information important to
“security-adjacent” stories, such as stories on private immigration prisons49 or
drone monitoring of water protector protestors at Standing Rock.50
While this examination of news media use of FOIA reveals that it does
serve its core accountability goal, a robust right to information can also have
additional, broader systemic effects, deterring official misconduct by
establishing a likelihood that such behavior will be uncovered. Just as an
employee is likely to work harder if their supervisor is standing nearby, the
knowledge that an official’s actions are subject to public scrutiny will likely
lead them to be more careful and judicious in their decision-making and to
take greater care in expending public resources.51
These structural effects can be difficult to pin down, but one example
from Canada provides an interesting insight as to how this can work. In
2011, a journalist filed an access to information request targeting helicopter
46
See, e.g., Press Release, Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash., CREW and Others Sue for White
House Visitor Logs (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.citizensforethics.org/news/press-releases/crew-otherssue-white-house-visitor-logs/. Access to the White House visitor logs, which are meant to provide insight
into the operations of the executive branch, were a major point of contention throughout the Trump
administration.
47
See, e.g., Margaret B. Kwoka, The Procedural Exceptionalism of National Security Secrecy, 97
B.U. L. REV. 103, 139 (2017) (describing those exemptions); Pozen, supra note 39, at 1097 (arguing that
FOIA is least effective in those areas due to the breadth of the exemptions).
48
FOIA Project Staff, When FOIA Goes to Court: 20 Years of Freedom of Information Act
Litigation by News Organizations and Reporters, FOIA PROJECT (Jan. 13, 2021), http://foiaproject.org/
2021/01/13/foialitigators2020/.
49
Telephone Interview by Margaret B. Kwoka with Seth Freed Wessler, Freelance Investigative
Reporter (Apr. 10, 2019); Special Investigation: Dying in Private Prisons, NATION, https://www.the
nation.com/special/private-prison-deaths (last visited Mar. 15, 2022).
50
Interview with Will Parrish, Freelance Investigative Journalist (Feb. 25, 2019); Alleen Brown,
Will Parrish & Alice Speri, Police Used Private Security Aircraft for Surveillance in Standing Rock
No-Fly Zone, INTERCEPT (Sept. 29, 2017, 10:41 AM), https://theintercept.com/2017/09/29/standingrock-dakota-access-pipeline-dapl-no-fly-zone-drones-tigerswan/; KWOKA, supra note 14, at 46.
51
See Australian Law Reform Commission, Open Government: A Review of the Federal Freedom
of Information Act 1982 (Report No 77, p. 8, December 1995), https://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/file
s/2020-03/report-40.pdf (citing this impact, specifically, as a public interest underlying that country’s
freedom of information act).
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travel by Peter MacKay, then Canada’s Defense Minister. The request
revealed that MacKay had utilized a search-and-rescue helicopter to return
from a fishing holiday in Newfoundland, asking that the flight be conducted
“under the guise” of a training mission in order to mask any impropriety.53
The response of military officials to the initial request reveals the impact of
Canada’s access to information system on their thinking:
If we are tasked to do this, we of course will comply . . . . Given
the potential for negative press though, I would likely
recommend against it, especially in view of the fact the air force
receives (or at least used to) regular access-to-information
requests specifically targeting travel on Canadian Forces
aircraft by ministers.54
This episode demonstrates the impact that transparency can have as a
motivator for promoting responsible management of public resources. Faced
with an ethically questionable request, officials specifically cited Canada’s
right to know law as a reason to be careful.
The furor that eventually resulted from the trip is equally illustrative of
why access to information systems commonly face resistance from those
tasked with responding to requests.55 Disclosures may be embarrassing to
those involved. Even if officials have not done anything wrong, there may be
apprehension that requesters will misinterpret or deliberately spin information
to support a negative narrative. While the benefits of a strong and effective
right-to-information system are longer term and structural, in terms of
promoting trust in government and improving relations with the public, the
potential downsides can be immediate and direct for the people responding to
requests. It is likely for this reason that there is a “long standing FOIA-averse
attitude common within most executive administrations.”56 And it is precisely
for this reason that the oversight system—FOIA—itself needs to be overseen.
Robust enforcement of the Act with remedies for its violation are prerequisites
to success.
II. THE FAILURE OF FOIA OVERSIGHT
The central role that public agencies subject to FOIA play in
implementing the law—by processing requests, making decisions on
52
Gloria Galloway & Steven Chase, PM Defends MacKay Against Charges He Misled House on
Chopper Ride, GLOBE & MAIL (Dec. 2, 2011), https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawanotebook/pm-defends-mackay-against-charges-he-misled-house-on-chopper-ride/article619735.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
National Post Staff, MPs Demand Resignation of Peter MacKay After Release of Fishing Trip
Airlift Emails, NAT’L POST (Dec. 2, 2011), https://nationalpost.com/news/mps-demand-resignation-ofpeter-mackay-after-release-of-fishing-trip-airlift-emails.
56
Ben Wasike, FoIA in the Age of “Open. Gov”: An Analysis of the Performance of the Freedom
of Information Act Under the Obama and Bush Administrations, 33 GOV’T INFO. Q. 417, 418 (2016).
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whether to release records, and otherwise dispensing of transparency
obligations—creates an obvious tension in the efficacy of FOIA as a
mechanism of public accountability over these same agencies. As a result,
having some recourse when the executive branch resists its transparency
obligations is crucial. This Part documents the institutional design choices
Congress made when it enacted FOIA, the failure of the primary recourse
mechanism—judicial review—to adequately oversee agency oversight, and
the recent set of reforms designed to address the failure through an
ombudsman office. Using the experience of the news media as a benchmark
for measuring FOIA’s success, it demonstrates that current oversight is
woefully inadequate, largely insulating executive branch secrecy from
meaningful review.
A. Judicial Review
The legislative history of FOIA makes clear that Congress understood
how important independent oversight of agency decisions to withhold
records would be.57 Indeed, it was an animating concern in the design of the
statute, in particular the judicial review provision that requires courts to
review agency decisions to withhold records de novo. Judicial oversight
remains the primary recourse for a dissatisfied requester, though Congress
has tried to strengthen its efficacy over the years.
Prior to the passage of FOIA, the disclosure mandate for agencies was
limited to a single sentence of the APA, admonishing that “persons properly
and directly concerned” with certain government-held information should
be given access, “except information held confidential for good cause
found.”58 Among its many deficiencies, one House Report explained that,
under that law, “there is no remedy available to a citizen who has been
wrongfully denied access to the Government’s public records.”59
When FOIA was enacted, remedies for dissatisfied requesters were at
the forefront of discussions.60 The statute initially created two kinds of
recourse. The first is an administrative appeal through which a person who
receives an adverse determination in response to their request may appeal to
a higher official within that same agency.61 That appeal does not come with
any cost, is relatively informal, and is subject to a short deadline for an
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S. REP. NO. 88-1219, at 8 (1964).
Id.
59
H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 5 (1966).
60
See DANIEL J. SHEFFNER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46238, THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
(FOIA): A LEGAL OVERVIEW 1-3 (2020) (noting that FOIA was “enacted . . . as an amendment to the
APA” in order “[t]o rectify the APA’s perceived failure to provide the public with adequate access to
government information”).
61
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i)(III)(aa).
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agency response. But, of course, the review is not independent of the
agency where the records reside. Rather, the appeal is to a different
decisionmaker within the same executive branch agency to which the initial
request was made, and which issued the initial unsatisfactory response.63
The main form of independent oversight and enforcement is through
judicial review. Even though most other agency actions are subject to some
sort of deferential standard of review, FOIA contains its own cause of action
with de novo review of any agency decision to withhold records.64 As
members of Congress explained: “the proceeding must be de novo . . . in
order that the ultimate decision as to the propriety of the agency’s action is
made by the court and prevent it from becoming meaningless judicial
sanctioning of agency discretion.”65
The strength of the judicial review provision was almost immediately
undermined by the courts themselves. In a 1973 decision in EPA v. Mink,
the Supreme Court ruled that, despite the de novo review provision, if
records were withheld because they were classified, a court had no power to
review the propriety of the classification decision.66 Congress was swift in
its response. It passed a major set of amendments to FOIA in 1974, which
included revising the judicial review provision to overrule Mink, making
clear that courts must review classification decisions and that courts had the
power to review classified records in camera.67
Thus, Congress twice insisted on a full, independent adjudication by the
courts without any deference to the executive agency’s determination to
withhold records. These legislative efforts underscore that independent
oversight was always intended to be a crucial part of the design of the right
to know regime in the United States.
B. Insulating Executive Secrecy
Since its inception, FOIA experienced serious challenges in its
implementation, including agency delay, agency nonresponsiveness, and an
expansive interpretation of the statute’s exemptions to mandatory
disclosure. These underlying administrative implementation failures are

62

Id. § 552(a)(6).
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For a much more detailed account of the issue of standards of review under FOIA, see generally
Margaret B. Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, 54 B.C. L. REV. 185 (2013) [hereinafter Kwoka, Deferring].
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111 CONG. REC. 26,823 (1965).
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EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 81–84 (1973), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561, as recognized in CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 189 (1985) (Marshall, J.
concurring).
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To effectuate this goal, Congress changed Exemption 1, which covers classified records, to
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withheld records. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
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compounded by the lack of an appropriate mechanism for holding agencies
accountable where they flout the law.
One way of measuring how well FOIA is functioning is by examining
the experience of journalists and watchdog groups, groups of requesters who
Congress thought to be the prime intended users of the law. To the extent
FOIA is not serving their interests well, it is not accomplishing the objective
Congress had in mind. Moreover, if it is not serving those requesters well, it
is likely failing requesters across the board in the same ways.
The single biggest complaint of frequent FOIA requesters, including
those using the law for core oversight purposes such as journalists and
watchdog groups, is the delays in obtaining information. Though the law
requires a response within twenty business days, average processing times
far exceed that.68 For example, in Fiscal Year 2020, the average processing
time, even for designated “simple track” requests, was over thirty business
days, and, at the end of the reporting period, the federal government had a
total of 141,762 backlogged requests.69
News media organizations and civil society watchdog groups alike
complain about the persistent delays they experience in accessing public
records under FOIA. In honor of FOIA’s fiftieth birthday, for example,
investigative news organization ProPublica published a piece entitled
“Delayed, Denied, Dismissed: Failures on the FOIA Front,” detailing a
series of frustrating experiences their reporters had requesting records under
FOIA.70 They almost universally featured delay as a central component of
the problem.71 As the summary describes, “waits for records now routinely
last longer than most journalists can wait—or so long that the information
requested is no longer useful.” 72
In a previous study of journalist use of FOIA that one of us conducted,
every reporter interviewed cited delay as a significant obstacle to using the
law effectively.73 For example, independent journalist Seth Freed Wessler
explained that “the obvious problem with FOIA is that for the vast majority of
federal FOIAs that I file and others file, information is either never released
or it takes so long for that information to be released that it becomes potentially
irrelevant.”74 Charles Seife, a journalism professor at Columbia University
68

Id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i).
OFF. OF INFO. POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2020: HIGHLIGHTS OF KEY GOVERNMENTWIDE FOIA DATA 9 (2021), https://www.justice.gov/
oip/page/file/1393381/download.
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(July 21, 2016, 8:01 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/delayed-denied-dismissed-failures-on-thefoia-front.
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KWOKA, supra note 14, at 175.
74
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Investigative Reporter (Apr. 10, 2019)).
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who focuses on science reporting, said that, “[b]y the time you get the
documents you need, I mean, we’re talking about something that was
scandalous in the FDA a decade ago, and it’s really hard to get that out there.”75
These accounts are clearly troubling, but delay is not a problem limited to
journalists or watchdog groups. Delay is a tremendous issue for individuals
seeking their own files to be used as part of their bid for agency administered
benefits or to defend against agency enforcement. In the United States, fully
half of all FOIA requesters seek their own immigration records, oftentimes for
the purpose of establishing their status or defending against deportation.76 In
2019, American Immigration Council filed a class action, alleging systemic
violations of FOIA’s deadlines, which causes significant injury to noncitizens
awaiting their records.77 They ultimately won an injunction against federal
immigration agencies, requiring them to take certain measures to comply with
the law.78
Beyond delay and unresponsive agencies, FOIA’s efficacy is further
hampered by persistent agency overwithholding of records. As a formal
matter, FOIA requires disclosure of all agency records, subject to nine
enumerated exemptions listed in the statute.79 The scope of those exemptions,
however, is the subject of much debate, with public bodies often incorporating
an expansive interpretation of what can be legitimately withheld.
For example, in the area of national security, records that have been
properly classified pursuant to an executive order are exempt from
disclosure.80 But, the classification criteria are so broad and so vague that
overclassification is a rampant problem, which is something widely agreed
upon inside and outside of government.81 Courts have also been instrumental
in stretching an exemption’s meaning to cover vast swaths of government
records, as the Supreme Court did when it decided that the exemption for
confidential commercial information included any records that a business
submitted to the government that it would not ordinarily make public.82
Congress has made some attempts to mitigate these implementation
challenges, particularly through the 2016 FOIA Improvement Act, which
added a requirement that agencies could only withhold records under a FOIA
exemption “if the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an
75
Id. at 176 (citing Telephone Interview by Margaret B. Kwoka with Charles Seife, Professor,
Columbia School of Journalism (Feb. 15, 2019)).
76
Id. at 85.
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Nightingale v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 507 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1195–96 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
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Id. at 1213–14.
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See, e.g., Examining the Costs of Overclassification on Transparency and Security: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. 1-2 (2016) (statement of Jason
Chaffetz, Chairman of H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform) (describing, among other things, how
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82
Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2360–61, 2366 (2019).
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83

interest protected by an exemption.” It also limited the application of one
of the most oft-cited bases for withholding records—the deliberative process
privilege—to records less than twenty-five years old.84 In the Senate Report
accompanying the Act, lawmakers explained that “there are concerns that
some agencies are overusing FOIA exemptions that allow, but do not
require, information to be withheld from disclosure.”85
Yet, these reforms have had a relatively limited impact against the
broader trend toward more and more secrecy. In Fiscal Year 2020, only
about thirty-one percent of all requests were granted in full, whereas
sixty-one percent were released in part and about seven percent were denied
in full.86 Exemption 5, which contains the deliberative process privilege,
remained one of the most frequently cited, alongside privacy and law
enforcement exemptions.87
At the heart of these problems, however, is a fundamental oversight
failure and a demonstration of the inadequacy of judicial remedies to
guarantee robust implementation of both the spirit and the letter of the law.
Going to court is a costly, time-consuming, and, for most requesters,
inaccessible process. Those who make it to court face an uphill battle as a
result of the judiciary’s reticence to second guess the executive branch on
matters of secrecy. Thus, the availability and independence of judicial
oversight are both unsatisfactory.
Beginning with availability, litigating in federal court is both expensive
and technically difficult. Filing a civil claim requires paying a $350 fee, even
if a requester is able to represent themself.88 But most people are not able to
represent themselves in federal litigation. Litigation is complex, with myriad
rules and procedures that nonlawyers are ill-equipped to navigate. Lawyers
are, of course, expensive, and there are few attorneys who regularly take
FOIA cases pro bono. Even attorneys who use FOIA as part of their
representation of clients hardly ever go to court to fight FOIA denials; the
time and money are too much of a barrier to most clients who are represented
in related matters.89
For requesters who work at the heart of government oversight—the
news media—the cost of resorting to litigation as a remedy for FOIA
violations is oftentimes insurmountable. The resource-intensive nature of
the FOIA process is illustrated by the fact that FOIA use is declining among

83
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smaller local outlets. Instead, journalists who are active requesters tend to
work for publications with broader based funding models, such as the
Associated Press, which is funded by providing content to a range of outlets,
or the Center for Public Integrity, which is funded through charitable giving,
or The New York Times, whose scale and international audience provides
greater resources for their reporters.91 Independent or freelance reporters are
even more disadvantaged than their counterparts in local media, as they lack
any institutional support to fund a FOIA fight.92
The fact that few reporters can go to court when faced with a recalcitrant
agency is particularly troubling when paired with the observations of those
who have gone to court about the power of independent review. For
example, Will Parrish of the Intercept, citing one FOIA request that had been
languishing for two years with no response, opined, “I think that a big
problem is there are some agencies that just try to ignore things, [until]
they’re pushed by a legal adjudication or something like that.”93 Charles
Seife, a journalism professor at New York University, said he only started
finding FOIA helpful when he found pro bono representation and was able
to litigate denials.94
Just filing a case can make a difference, even without actual review. New
York Times Vice President and Deputy General Counsel David McCraw said
the federal court filing fee served as a sort of “concierge fee” because he uses
lawsuits to force a nonresponsive agency to respond to the request.95 The
ProPublica account of its use of FOIA connected agency nonresponse to the
declining resources of journalists, explaining that “they bank on the media’s
depleted resources and [in]ability to legally challenge most denials.”96
Finally, there is good reason to believe that, even for those requesters
who make it through the gauntlet of getting into court, judicial review is
often not serving the oversight function well. Court itself is an incredibly
slow dispute resolution process. The Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse’s FOIA Project recently reported that, over time, “FOIA
requesters are facing longer and longer delays before their cases are decided”
90
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INFORMATION 116, 122–23 (David E. Pozen & Michael Schudson eds., 2018).
91
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and that “the backlog of pending FOIA court cases is growing much faster
than the increase in litigation because judges are failing to rule in a timely
manner and allowing cases to drag on for years.”97 Given the speed of the
modern news cycle and the pressures that journalists are under to meet
publication deadlines, any process which takes years to resolve is clearly not
a satisfactory answer to the ongoing implementation challenges.
Moreover, the independence of the review is not always fully realized.
Congress prescribed de novo review of agency withholdings, which is to say
that the courts were to give no deference to agency decisions about the
applicability of FOIA’s exemptions to disclosure.98 Yet, despite this, courts
still exercise significant deference to the government’s position in FOIA
litigation, undermining a full independent review.99
For example, in the context of national security classification claims,
Susan Nevelow Mart and Tom Ginsburg demonstrated that plaintiffs win in
FOIA cases only five percent of the time.100 They further described the
sources of judicial reluctance to review agency decisions regarding national
security.101 Deference to the agency in these cases is so routine that courts
oftentimes refer to the standard of review as “substantial weight” review,
rather than “de novo” review, because the courts in these cases accord
“substantial weight” to the government’s affidavits.102
Courts in FOIA cases also allow the government to avail themselves of
procedural shortcuts that further undermine the litigant’s position. This
includes curtailing discovery, which limits the plaintiff’s ability to uncover
evidence that would go to factual disputes surrounding the creation or use of
disputed records.103 Courts can also be reticent to exercise their power to
review records in camera.104
All of this expense, delay, and deference combines to yield a tiny
percentage of FOIA denials that are ever reviewed by a court, and an even
tinier fraction that result in any relief for the requester. Out of around
800,000 requests now made per year, only around 15,000 administrative
appeals are filed, or around three percent.105 And from the requests and
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appeals, only about 700 lawsuits are filed in federal court each year. What
oversight the federal courts provide to enforce agency compliance with
FOIA is therefore relatively minimal.
A. Incremental Administrative Oversight
Forty years after passing the first version of the law, Congress amended
the Freedom of Information Act to, for the first time, “provide FOIA
requestors and federal agencies with a meaningful alternative to costly
litigation.”107 In the 2007 Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National
(OPEN) Government Act, Congress established the Office of Government
Information Services (OGIS) within the National Archives and Records
Administration.108 Designed to serve as a “FOIA Ombudsman,” OGIS
represents the first step toward administrative, rather than judicial, oversight
of FOIA compliance.109
OGIS was given two primary oversight responsibilities. First, it was
tasked with reviewing agencies’ administration of the Act and
recommending policy changes to Congress and the executive as needed.110
Second, OGIS was to “offer mediation services to resolve disputes between
persons making requests under this section and administrative agencies as a
non-exclusive alternative to litigation and, at OGIS’s discretion, may issue
advisory opinions if mediation has not resolved the dispute.”111
As to the first set of responsibilities—overseeing agency compliance
with the Act—one complication has always been that this responsibility was
already, to a great extent, delegated to the Department of Justice’s Office of
Information Policy (OIP). OIP has always issued FOIA guidance to
executive agencies, maintained the annual FOIA reports, and communicated
information about compliance with the Act to Congress.112 The Department
of Justice (DOJ), of course, is an executive agency led by the Attorney
General, a cabinet-level political appointee who serves at the pleasure of the
President, not an independent oversight body.113 But OGIS is not truly
independent. Rather, it is located within the National Archives and Records
106
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Administration (NARA), which is sometimes thought of as an independent
agency but actually lacks its hallmarks, particularly any protection for the
Archivist from removal of office by the President at will.114 While NARA
often operates more independently than some agencies, NARA is, at base,
an executive branch agency.115
Indeed, the relationship between OGIS and OIP has not been entirely
smooth. In an early audit by the Government Accountability Office, it was
reported that OGIS’s Director said that “OGIS’s relationship with the DOJ
could be more cooperative, but OGIS was able to work with the DOJ in order
to meet its statutory requirements”116—hardly a ringing endorsement of
inter-agency harmony. But, even if it were harmonious, neither entity is truly
independent of the executive branch.
The lack of independence of these oversight bodies has come up in
Congressional debates. For example, OIP conducts annual assessments of
all agencies’ compliance with FOIA on twenty-four different metrics.117 In
a 2015 hearing, one member of Congress questioned the director of OIP
about the legitimacy of the DOJ’s perfect score on that assessment, asking,
“Do you really think that anyone in the world believes that the [D]epartment
of [J]ustice is a 5 out of 5, A+ for proactive disclosure?,” to which the
director responded, “I absolutely do.”118 The incredulous member of
Congress responded, “Man! You live in la-la land, that’s the problem! You
live in a fantasy land.”119
As to OGIS’s oversight authority, when the agency was created, DOJ
originally took the position that, as part of an executive branch agency, it
had to send any proposed recommendations for policy changes through the
Office of Management and Budget’s executive review processes, an
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ten years, removable only for good cause, see S. REP. NO. 98-373, at 23 . . . but this section was changed
by the Conference Committee to its present form, in which the term of the Archivist is not specified, and
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John W. Carlin, NARA Marks Twentieth Anniversary of Independence Legislation, 36
PROLOGUE 4, 4 (2004) (describing the NARA as an “independent agency within the executive branch”).
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AUDIT OF NARA’S OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SERVICES 6 (2012).
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120

expressly political review. OGIS’s early recommendations died in this
“consultation process.”121
This level of institutional control had not been Congress’s intent when
it created OGIS, though it was an inevitable result of how the agency was
constituted.122 OGIS’s director testified before Congress in 2015:
I understand that you and your colleagues in the Senate
expected to receive unvarnished recommendations for
legislative or regulatory change from an independent and
impartial ombudsman. If you do want recommendations,
reports and testimony that have not had to be reviewed,
changed and approved by the very agencies that might be
affected, then you should change the statute.123
With the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, Congress amended the law
to expressly allow OGIS to submit recommendations directly to Congress
and the President, without the need for political review.124 However, the
change did not alter the core problem, which is that the OGIS itself is housed
within the executive branch agency, and it therefore lacks full independence.
As to OGIS’s second set of statutory mandates—the provision of
mediation services and possible resulting advisory opinions—here, too, its
powers are limited in important ways. To begin, as one report from the
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) noted, one
“structural problem” with OGIS mediation is that agencies have no “duty to
participate” in the process.125 Indeed, the very first OGIS annual report noted
that “some Federal agencies viewed OGIS as the ‘FOIA police’ and thus
were somewhat reluctant to share information with OGIS and to work with
the Office to resolve disputes.”126
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S. REP. NO. 114-4, at 3 (2015). See also Office of Management and Budget, WHITE HOUSE,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb (last visited Mar. 20, 2022) (“The Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) serves the President of the United States in overseeing the implementation of his or her vision
across the Executive Branch.”).
121
See, e.g., Letter from Miriam Nisbet, Director, Off. of Gov’t Info. Servs., to Hon. Patrick J.
Leahy, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, & Hon. Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member,
U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Apr. 13, 2012), https://sunshineingov.files.wordpress.com/2012/0
4/ogis_letter_leahy_grassley_13april2012.pdf (describing OMB as a stumbling block for OGIS’s
recommendations reaching Congress).
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Gov’t Operations of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. 5 (2015) (statement of
Miriam Nisbet, Former Director, OGIS).
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FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-185, § 2(5)(D), 130 Stat. 538, 541 (2016).
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TARGETED ADR STRATEGIES 51 (2014).
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Even where agencies do choose to engage with the OGIS, however,
OGIS has no power to issue a binding order.127 Rather, it only has the power
to engage in mediation and, if it chooses, to issue advisory opinions.128 One
director explained that under the 2007 OPEN Government Act, “OGIS
struggled with how to reconcile its authority to issue advisory opinions with
its ability to be an impartial party that facilitates the resolution of disputes
between requesters and agencies.”129 In the 2016 amendments, Congress
broadened OGIS’s authority to deliver advisory opinions. OGIS then
pivoted toward issuing advisory opinions to address not individual cases, but
rather “common disputes, complaints, and trends” that OGIS sees through
its dispute resolution process.130 As a result, in its ten-year existence, OGIS
has issued exactly two advisory opinions.131
OGIS has had some success in its mediation program. It receives more
than 4,000 requests for mediation assistance per year.132 Moreover, while
complex cases still take longer than OGIS’s target of ninety days to
resolve,133 the process remains much quicker than judicial resolution ever
could be. OGIS has also engaged in extensive outreach, training, and
compliance work, and the stature of the office has risen accordingly.134 But,
for all these successes, continuing implementation challenges demonstrate a
need for better oversight of the FOIA system, particularly given the
importance of FOIA for maintaining robust public accountability. While the
standing up of OGIS represents an important development, the present
system also leaves considerable room for improvement. The following Part
carries out a comparative survey of global FOIA oversight structures,
followed by a deeper dive into enforcement models in the United States’ two
neighbors, Canada and Mexico, to consider the elements of a successful
system and to develop ideas for improving the OGIS and the FOIA oversight
system more generally.
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Advisory Opinions, NAT’L ARCHIVES: OFF. OF GOV’T INFO. SERVS. (OGIS),
https://www.archives.gov/ogis/advisory-opinions (last visited Mar. 20, 2022).
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(Jan. 4, 2022).
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III. COMPARATIVE OVERSIGHT MODELS
While the United States was an early right-to-know adopter, it is a relative
latecomer in its development of a specialized administrative oversight body
as part of that framework. There are dozens of other countries around the
world that have successfully implemented independent administrative
oversight as part of their national right-to-information frameworks.135 Some
of their oversight bodies have been operating for decades.136
Although every country operates in its own unique administrative and
bureaucratic context, the experiences of other countries in combating
common challenges to the right to information, particularly concerning how
to promote compliance and a culture of openness, can be instructive in
considering possible avenues to reform. This is particularly true given that
the executive accountability function, which is at the core of FOIA, is not
unique to the American system, but is relatively common around the world.
Although a few right-to-information laws have been implemented as decrees
from the executive branch,137 the vast majority of global frameworks are
enacted as legislation by the congress, parliament, or equivalent legislative
body.138 Moreover, while nearly every global right-to-information law
targets the executive branch,139 it is relatively common for these laws to
exclude the legislative branch or to only apply to the legislature in a very
limited way.140 In other words, the American context, whereby Congress has
implemented FOIA as an accountability check on the executive,141 is
135

See generally CÉLINE KAUFFMANN & REBECCA SCHULTZ, OECD REGUL. POL’Y DIV., CASE
STUDIES OF REGWATCHEUROPE REGULATORY OVERSIGHT BODIES AND OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
REGULATORY SCRUTINY BOARD (2018), https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/Oversight-bodiesweb.pdf.
136
See, e.g., Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c A-1, § 54 (Can.) (operating in Canada since
1983); Official Information Act 1982, pt. 5, s 28(1) (N.Z.) (operating in New Zealand since 1982).
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See, e.g., NAT’L CONCILIATION & MEDIATION BD., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: EXECUTIVE ORDER
NO. 02 S. 2016 OPERATIONALIZING IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH THE PEOPLE’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
INFORMATION AND THE STATE POLICIES TO FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE PUBLIC
SERVICE AND PROVIDING GUIDELINES THEREFOR. 3, https://ncmb.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/foima
nual.pdf (the Philippines is one example of a country where the right to information has been implemented by
presidential decree, but the system is limited and comparatively weak).
138
See generally OPEN SOC’Y JUST. INITIATIVE, COUNTRIES THAT GUARANTEE A RIGHT OF ACCESS
TO INFORMATION (RTI) IN NATIONAL/FEDERAL LAWS OR DECREES + DATES OF ADOPTION & SIGNIFICANT
AMENDMENTS: 128 COUNTRIES, INC. 3 NON-MEMBERS OF THE UN, AS OF 1 SEPTEMBER 2018,
https://eyeonglobaltransparency.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Updated-Countries-with-ATI-Laws-Sept
ember-2018-2.pdf (demonstrating that right to information laws are much more common than decrees).
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According to the RTI Rating, the only country that did not score any points on this indicator was
Tajikistan, as a result of the law’s ambiguous definitions. Country Data: By Indicator, GLOB. RIGHT TO
INFO. RATING, https://www.rti-rating.org/country-data/by-indicator/7 (last visited Mar. 20, 2022) (select
“Indicator 7”).
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See, e.g., supra note 136; Gyōsei kikan no hoyū suru jōhō no kōkai ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on
Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs], Act No. 42 of 1999, arts. 1, 2(1)(i) (Japan)
(excluding the National Diet entirely).
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What Is FOIA?, supra note 4.
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common across a number of comparable democracies, thus enhancing the
applicability of lessons that may be drawn from these peer systems, in
particular regard to the need for oversight structures that are outside the
control of the executive.
This Part uses a comparative approach to reveal important factors in the
success of independent oversight structures in order to inform possible
avenues for improving oversight of FOIA.
A. Evaluating Oversight
There has not been much academic treatment regarding the characteristics
of a strong and effective oversight system in the right-to-information space,
though the general importance of independence in oversight bodies is fairly
well established.142 Sarah Holsen and Martial Pasquier, in a paper specifically
addressing this question, noted a “general consensus” that oversight bodies
should be granted binding decision-making power in order to give a body the
“teeth” to enforce its rulings in the face of political or bureaucratic resistance
and to generate official legal precedents that will be useful for future
decision-making.143 However, Holsen and Pasquier’s analysis draws heavily
from civil society writings on this theme, specifically by three organizations
which specialize on the right to information: the Centre for Law and
Democracy, Access Info Europe, and the Carter Center.144
Laura Neuman, the Director of the Carter Center’s Global Access to
Information Program, lists six qualities of a robust oversight system, namely
that it should be independent from political influence; accessible to
requesters without the need for legal representation; absent overly
formalistic requisites; affordable; timely; and specialist in transparency.145
These values roughly correspond to the earmarks of a strong oversight
system spelled out in the Global RTI Rating, a comparative methodology
designed by the Centre for Law and Democracy and Access Info Europe,
which assesses the strength of right-to-information systems around the
world.146 Specific indicators assessed by the RTI Rating include the speed
with which appeals are processed, the cost to requesters of filing an appeal,
the ease with which individuals can access and navigate the system, and the
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147

independence of the oversight body. This latter category is assessed through
a number of factors, including the body’s appointment process, whether its
members have the security of tenure, whether individuals with strong political
connections are prohibited from being appointed to the body, the body’s level
of financial independence, and the breadth of the body’s mandate.148
However, while the RTI Rating explicitly values order-making power
as preferable to a recommendation-based system, Neuman’s analysis adopts
a more nuanced approach, presenting the counterpoint that a
recommendation-based model can help to foster less adversarial relations
between the oversight body and governmental institutions, allowing for the
exercise of more collaborative and persuasive approaches to promoting
good practice.149
B. International Case Studies
As of August 2021, there are 129 countries with access to information,
right to information, or freedom of information laws in force, according to
the Global RTI Rating.150 Of these, at least eighty-two countries allow the
public to file appeals with an external oversight body (either a specialized
information commissioner or a general purpose oversight body such as an
ombudsman).151 In at least fifty of these countries, the oversight body is
explicitly designated as reporting to the parliament or to the legislature,152
though nearly every oversight body includes at least some measures aimed
at supporting its independence.153
In around half of the countries that have an oversight body, the oversight
body is able to issue legally binding orders.154 For the most part, this tracks with
the division between countries that have created a specialized oversight body to
handle information requests (typically an information commission or
commissioner) and those who delegate this responsibility to a general
governmental oversight body. There are exceptions to this, particularly Japan’s
Information Disclosure and Personal Information Protection Review Board155
and Portugal’s Comissão de Acesso aos Documentos Administrativos,156 which
147
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by Administrative Organs], Act No. 42 of 1999, art. 18 (Japan).
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Lei n. ̊ 46/2007 de 24 de Agosto [Act no. 46/2007 of 24 August], art. 12, no. 2 & art. 27, no. 1,
para. c (Port.).
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are both examples of specialized oversight bodies that operate on a
recommendation-based model. But, in the majority of examples where an
information oversight body does not have the power to issue binding orders, a
general governmental oversight body carries out the task.
In European systems, such as in Finland,157 Moldova,158 Kosovo,159 and
Germany,160 appeals are commonly handled by the ombudsman. However,
this structure is not unique to Europe. Trinidad and Tobago,161 the Cook
Islands,162 and Rwanda163 also refer appeals to the ombudsman, whose
power is limited to making recommendations. Other countries, such as
Malawi164 and Mongolia,165 direct appeals or complaints to the Human
Rights Commission, which is likewise limited to making recommendations
or, in the case of Mongolia, to referring matters to the courts if it feels a
government body is failing to fulfill its legal obligations.166
By contrast, where countries establish a specialized information
commission or commissioner, the dominant approach is to provide these
entities with the power to order documents to be disclosed. India167 and
Mexico168 are commonly cited as examples of this type of model, but similar
arrangements are in place in numerous other countries, including
Indonesia,169 Serbia,170 and the United Kingdom.171
Of the countries that allow their oversight body to issue binding rulings,
there are typically two models for how it is enforced. On the one hand, the
enabling legislation may include direct sanctions for violating an order of
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the oversight body. In some cases, this allows oversight bodies to directly
level fines for noncompliance with their decisions or even for broader
measures that undermine the right to information, without the need for any
intervention from the courts at all.173
An alternate model is to include a legal provision stating that the failure
to abide by a ruling of the oversight body may be treated as equivalent to
contempt of court.174 Though this is obviously less efficient than allowing
the oversight body to levy fines directly, it builds in more procedural fairness
for public institutions by requiring court intervention before a fine may be
imposed. An additional layer of procedure, found in some systems, is
implemented to require the Commission to file its order with a relevant court
for enforcement before it is considered binding.175
Unlike traditional forms of monetary penalty, which come out of the
pockets of transgressors, one potential challenge to using fines to promote
compliance is that the end result of a fine levied by an oversight body against
a public institution means essentially moving funds from one corner of the
public purse to another.176 A particularly unscrupulous government could
simply top-off the budget of the offending institution to make up for the cost
of fines paid, or it could even nullify the impact of the fine entirely by
deducting an equivalent amount from the oversight body’s budget. In order
to mitigate this risk, some right-to-information systems allow officials
responsible for undermining the law to be fined personally.177 This type of
system is generally not a mainstream practice and is likely unpopular among
officials who would potentially be subject to fines.
One final note is that it is not unusual for systems that include
order-making power to also provide for mediation processes at the front
end. For example, in Indonesia, the law mandates that the first stage of the
Information Commission’s review is to initiate a mediation process
between the complainant and the public body, whose consensus result is
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178

legally binding. Only if this process fails will the Information Commission
move to an adjudication process.179 This runs counter to the narrative that
portrays a binary choice between rigid order-making systems and more
collaborative approaches.
C. Canada’s Enforcement Models
Although Canada’s Access to Information Act was passed nearly two
decades later than FOIA, it was one of the first laws of its kind to include a
specialized oversight body under the Information Commissioner.180 The
Commissioner is an independent officer of Parliament whose appointment
requires consultation with every recognized party in the Senate and in the
House of Commons, as well as approval by resolution of the Senate and of
the House of Commons.181 The Commissioner’s position includes additional
formal safeguards over her independence, notably that she reports to
Parliament, rather than to the executive, and that her salary and expenses are
established by legislation.182
The Information Commissioner may receive and investigate public
complaints regarding breaches of the Access to Information Act, and she has
the power to initiate complaints of her own volition and to refuse to
investigate complaints should she deem them frivolous or otherwise
unnecessary.183 Importantly, complaints to the Commissioner are free of
charge and do not require legal representation to file.184 The Access to
Information Act grants her office with broad powers of investigation,
including the ability to summon persons and compel their evidence, to enter
any premises occupied by any governmental institution and converse in
private with any person found there, and to examine any record within or
under the control of any governmental institution.185
Although the procedures for her decision-making are not spelled out in
the law, her office has developed a robust body of precedent to ground her
decision-making, including a lengthy investigation guide that spells out case

178

Public Information Disclosure Act, Act No. 14 of 2008, ch. 9, art. 40 (Indon.).
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law and interpretative guidelines related to each exception in the Access to
Information Act.186
Originally, the Information Commissioner was limited to making
non-binding recommendations, but this was reformed in 2019 to grant the
Information Commissioner power to make binding orders.187 This includes
the power to order documents to be disclosed, as well as any other solutions
the Commissioner considers appropriate.188 However, there are important
limitations to this ability, which do not apply to investigations which the
Commissioner herself initiates.189 Another important limitation is that the
law expressly provides government agencies with an avenue to appeal the
Commissioner’s decisions and that, importantly, these appeals are reviewed
in Federal Court as a de novo proceeding.190
In contrast to the U.S. model, where, as Part II noted, the de novo
standard of review is important to support judicial oversight, Canada’s
implementation of this standard has significantly weakened the position of
the oversight body, since it leaves the government with little incentive to
engage with the Information Commissioner during her review, given that the
government can just wait and introduce their arguments against disclosure
when the matter reaches the Federal Court.191 One former Information
Commissioner also noted that the lack of any direct recourse to enforce
orders was “problematic.”192
Although the federal Information Commissioner is the most prominent
face of Canada’s right-to-information system, virtually every province and
territory has some sort of independent oversight body. Of these, the Ontario
Information and Privacy Commissioner enjoys particularly robust
enforcement powers, as the law makes it an offense to fail to comply with
her orders, though the consent of the Attorney General is required in order
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to commence a prosecution under this provision. In Alberta, Quebec,195
Prince Edward Island,196 Nunavut,197 and British Columbia,198 decisions of
the oversight bodies may be filed with an appropriate court, giving them the
force and effect of a judgment by that court. In all five cases, while the
government has a right of judicial review, it is not carried out as a de novo
review.199 Most of the remaining provinces and territories operate under a
recommendation-based model for the oversight body.200 The exceptions to
this are Newfoundland and Labrador and Manitoba, which operate under
hybrid models.201 However, every Canadian oversight body enjoys robust
independence from the executive branch.202
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limit the respective oversight bodies to issuing non-binding recommendations.
201
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.N.L. 2015, c A-1.2, §§ 50–51 (Can.).
In Newfoundland and Labrador, the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act limits the
Information and Privacy Commissioner to making recommendations, but requires that the government
file an order with the Trial Division if they wish to avoid complying. Appeals to the Trial Division are
heard as a new matter, but this appeals system does not apply to procedural recommendations, such as
regarding timeframes for response or fees for access, which are not subject to additional review. See also
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, C.C.S.M. 1997, c F175, §§ 66(1), 66(4), 66.8(1),
66.9(1) (Can.). In Manitoba, complaints in the first instance go to the Ombudsman, which may make
recommendations. However, if these recommendations are not followed, the Ombudsman has the ability
to refer the matter to the Information and Privacy Adjudicator, which has order-making power. In other
words, the Ombudsman performs what is essentially a gatekeeping function for complaints. However, at
the end of this process, the government retains an ability to apply for a de novo review by the court.
202
See MICHAEL KARANICOLAS, CENTRE FOR L. & DEMOCRACY, FAILING TO MEASURE UP: AN
ANALYSIS OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION LEGISLATION IN CANADIAN JURISDICTIONS 16–17 (Toby
Mendel ed., 2012) (considering the strengths and weaknesses of different provincial and territorial
freedom of information legislation, including noting that the independence of these offices is relatively
consistent across Canada).
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D. Mexico’s Enforcement Model
In Mexico, the right to information is specifically guaranteed under
Article VI of the Constitution.203 Although the country’s General Act of
Transparency and Access to Public Information was first adopted in 2002,
an ambitious reform package was passed in 2015, which substantially
boosted both the substance of the right to information and its oversight
framework.204 As a result, the country has evolved into a position of regional
leadership on this issue, and it has come to be regarded as a success story on
the promise and potential of strong right-to-information legislation.205
The centerpiece of Mexico’s transparency framework is the Instituto
Nacional de Transparencia (INAI), a commission of seven members who are
appointed by the senate through a two-thirds vote, though the president
maintains some power to object to candidates.206 However, the INAI reports
to and has its budget approved by the senate.207 Once appointed, the
commissioners may only be removed through an impeachment process,
giving them strong security of tenure.208 The commissioners serve a term of
seven years, which is staggered to ensure a balanced flow of appointments.209
The INAI maintains extremely broad powers of review and remediation,
including the power to assess not only refusals to release information, but
also the delivery of incomplete information, the delivery of information that
does not match the request, the classification of information, the format in
which information has been delivered, the costs or delivery times for the
information, or any other procedural irregularity.210 The INAI also has the
power to review classified information in order to verify its status and need
for such protections.211 The INAI is required to resolve appeals for
reconsideration within thirty days of their filing, though that time period may
be extended once by an additional thirty days.212 In a complaint process, the
203
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CPEUM, Diario Oficial de la
Federación [DOF] 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 10-02-2014, art. 6 (Mex.).
204
ADRIANA GARCÍA GARCÍA, MEX. INST.: WILSON CTR., TRANSPARENCY IN MEXICO: AN
OVERVIEW OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION REGULATIONS AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS AT THE FEDERAL
AND STATE LEVEL 3–4 (2016).
205
Vivek Ramkumar & Diego de la Mora, Mexico’s Battle for Transparency, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Feb. 13, 2016, 1:31 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2016-0213/mexicos-battle-for-transparency; Paul Lagunes & Oscar Pocasangre, Dynamic Transparency: An
Audit of Mexico’s Freedom of Information Act, 97 PUB. ADMIN. 162, 162–63 (2019).
206
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CPEUM, Diario Oficial de la
Federación [DOF] 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 10-02-2014, art. 6(A)(VIII) (Mex.).
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
Ley General de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública [General Act of Transparency
and Access to Public Information], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 04-05-2015, últimas reformas
DOF 20-05-2021, art. 38 (Mex.).
210
Id. art. 143.
211
Id. art. 147.
212
Id. art. 165.
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burden of proof for justifying any denial of access to information lies with
the public entities that are the subject of the complaint.213
In addition to the power to order particular records to be disclosed,
Mexico also has a sophisticated regulatory structure to set and harmonize
right-to-information standards across the country through its National
Transparency System, a structure that includes the INAI and state-level
agencies, the Superior Audit Office, the General Archive of the Nation, and
the National Institute of Statistics and Geography.214 Together, these
agencies are tasked with establishing and harmonizing standards around
records management, data preservation, training, accessibility, and
education.215 The National Transparency System also has a broad mandate
to promote awareness of and engagement with the right to information,
supporting citizen participation in this area.216
IV. STRONG INSTITUTIONAL DESIGNS
There is no single, cookie-cutter solution to supporting compliance with
access to information or right-to-information rules. Each of the examples
spelled out in the previous sections operate in their own unique legal and
institutional contexts with externalities that might guide different
jurisdictions towards different solutions.217 Likewise, effective oversight is
only one component of a well-functioning right-to-information system,
alongside other factors like robust demand for information, public
engagement, clear legal standards for disclosure, and an institutional culture
that respects the rule of law.218
However, evidence suggests that certain design choices generally
provide stronger oversight and ultimately stronger executive
accountability.219 Despite the diverse legal and social contexts, both the
universality of bureaucratic resistance to transparency legislation and the
similarities in imposing legislative oversight over the executive branch’s
administrative arms support the value of comparative analysis as an avenue
for developing better global practice standards for overcoming this
213

Id. art. 105.
Id. art. 30.
215
Id. art. 31.
216
Id.
217
For example, the status of the rule of law is drastically different across many of the countries
surveyed in Part III. See supra Part III. See generally Moeen H. Cheema, The Politics of the Rule of Law,
24 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 449 (2016) (providing a deeper discussion of the relationship between legal
standards and contextual social and political pressures).
218
See MENDEL, supra note 8, at 31–40 (providing a general overview of the earmarks of a strong
right-to-information framework).
219
See, e.g., CENTRE FOR L. & DEMOCRACY, NOTE ON THE PAKISTAN RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
INFORMATION BILL, 2017 5 (2017), https://www.law-democracy.org/live/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/
Pakistan.RTI_.Note_.Oct17.pdf (providing a critical analysis of one such legal framework). The Centre
for Law and Democracy has authored dozens of similar assessments, which are available on their website.
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220

challenge.
This Part identifies two key factors to achieve effective
oversight of transparency administration, to the end of increasing
accountability over executive agencies.
A. Independence
The most unambiguous lesson to be drawn from transparency
experimentation around the globe is the value of having an independent
oversight body. From the requester standpoint, there is virtually no downside
to having access to a relatively quick, cheap, and effective remedy to
breaches of the law, as an alternative to going to court.221 But, given the
fundamental role that right-to-know laws have in checking executive power
exercised by administrative agencies, it is abundantly clear why oversight
structures that are independent from the agencies being held accountable are
a structural necessity.
The biases of political actors toward secrecy are not merely
hypothetical. For example, in 2019 alone, both Scott Pruitt, President
Trump’s first appointee to head the EPA, and Ryan Zinke, Trump’s first
appointee to head the Department of Interior, were forced to resign after
malfeasance exposed through requests made under FOIA.222 This might, at
first blush, seem like an illustration of FOIA’s power, and, to some degree,
it is. But what followed their resignations is equally, if not more, telling. In
both cases, the agencies ultimately responded to the scandals by tightening
political control over FOIA disclosures. The Department of Interior adopted
a new “awareness review” policy, requiring career staff to notify political
appointees if the appointees are involved in documents that are about to be
released. 223 Likewise, the EPA adopted a regulation allowing political
appointees to issue final determinations under FOIA.224
These policies elicited strong public outcries that FOIA decisions should
not be political,225 and, it turns out, rightly so. Awareness review was almost
220

See supra Part III.
See, e.g., Md Mahmudul Hoque, Information Institutions and the Political Accountability in
Bangladesh, 9 INT’L J. SCI. & ENG’G RSCH. 1586, 1590 (2018) (discussing the positive impacts of
information institutions in improving political accountability in Bangladesh).
222
Coral Davenport, Ethics Office Examines Allegations That Interior Dept. Officials Violated
Transparency Laws, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/23/climate/interiordepartment-freedom-of-information.html.
223
Memorandum from Cindy Cafaro, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior Departmental FOIA Officer, to
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior Assistant Sec’ys, Heads of Bureaus & Offs. & Bureau/Off. FOIA Officers
(Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/awareness_process_memo_2.0.pdf;
Davenport, supra note 222.
224
Davenport, supra note 222.
225
See, e.g., Daniel McGrath, Interior’s Proposed FOIA Rule Threatens Transparency and
Accountability, AM. OVERSIGHT (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.americanoversight.org/interiors-proposedfoia-rule-threatens-transparency-and-accountability (arguing that Interior’s policy was unlawful and
undermined FOIA).
221
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immediately used to hide records for political gain. Daniel Jorjani, a political
appointee who was serving as the top lawyer at the Department of the
Interior, used the awareness review policy to delay the release of hundreds
of pages of records involving then-Deputy Secretary David Bernhardt in
advance of confirmation hearings that would elevate Mr. Bernhardt to the
position of Secretary of the Interior.226 When subsequently asked by
Congress about his role in disclosure decisions, he misleadingly responded
that he “typically did not review records prior to their release under the
FOIA,”227 a statement that later led to criminal investigation.228
To be sure, the drive to exert political control over FOIA disclosures
transcends partisan divisions. In 2010, the Department of Homeland
Security under the Obama administration came under fire for issuing a
directive that various FOIA responses be reviewed by political appointees
for “awareness purposes,” leading to the delay of releases, including those
to Congress.229 If political appointees within administrative agencies are able
to interfere with the flow of disclosures to the public, it subverts the purpose
of FOIA as a mechanism of direct accountability.
This sort of political bias toward secrecy should not come as a surprise.
Accountability, for all its importance to the maintenance of democratic
institutions, is not a pleasant process for those on the receiving end of it.230 At
best, being made to explain or justify one’s actions can feel distracting and time
consuming.231 It can trigger defensiveness or feelings of hostility at having one’s
decision-making or performance questioned.232 Freedom of information
systems can be unpopular among officials, who may prefer to more actively
manage public perceptions of their work.233 Around the world, journalists and
other frequent requesters can relate endless stories of the various measures to
stymie information requests that they have encountered.234
226

Beitsch, supra note 7.
See id.
228
Id.
229
Ted Bridis, Playing Politics with Public Records Requests, NBC NEWS (July 21, 2010, 7:30
PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna38350993#.UcNcVPlwpQQ.
230
Andrew McGill, Why FOIA Is Broken, From a Government Worker’s Perspective, ATLANTIC
(July 6, 2016, 3:32 PM), https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2016/07/why-the-freedom-of-informationact-is-broken-from-a-government-employees-perspective/490181/.
231
Id.
232
Id.
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Paul Farrell, Hypocritical Politicians ‘Hate’ Freedom of Information, Says Former
Commissioner, GUARDIAN (Sept. 29, 2015, 9:30 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/sep/
30/politicians-hypocritical-on-freedom-of-information-says-former-commissioner.
234
See, e.g., Alasdair Roberts, A Great and Revolutionary Law? The First Four Years of India’s
Right to Information Act, 70 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 925, 928 (2010) (detailing harassment and even physical
attacks against citizens filing right-to-information requests); David Pugliese, DND Blames Clerk for
Internal Failures, Even as Documents Show Senior Officers Discussed Withholding Records, NAT’L
POST (Jan. 22, 2019), https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/dnd-blames-clerk-for-internal-failureseven-as-documents-show-senior-officers-discussed-withholding-records (describing a practice in which
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As a result, an independent oversight body should not be subject to the
political pressures to protect executive branch interests and further
presidential agendas. Agencies cannot be left to police themselves with
regard to their disclosure obligations.235 Because FOIA is a direct
mechanism for agency accountability, an independent mechanism to oversee
this oversight is imperative.
Existing oversight of FOIA obligations that most requesters can actually
access in the United States is not independent. And judicial remedies, while
independent, are largely inaccessible.236 While both internal administrative
remedies and judicial remedies can play an important role in a robust oversight
structure,237 they are no substitute for external administrative review.
While internal appeals and mediation can be effective at resolving certain
categories of appeals, such as where there is misunderstanding or confusion
between the requester and the public body regarding which records are being
sought, these appeals are unlikely to be helpful in addressing systemic
deficiencies or institutional resistance, since the authorities reviewing the
complaint will likely present the same attitude as those that first responded to
the request.238 That is, these internal appeals are decided by another executive
branch official, not by an independent adjudicator.
Judicial review, on the other hand, is fully independent, but it tends to
fall short due to the time and expense involved in making a complaint. These
logistical hurdles make this option impractical for all but a small minority of
determined requesters, generally those who have some sort of professional
or institutional backing to their request.239 The timeliness challenge is
exacerbated in contexts where requesters are required to exhaust these
internal remedies before they even pursue the matter in court, as is the case
with the federal system in the United States.240
As it is currently constituted, OGIS likewise fails to perform this
independent oversight function. First, it is not independent from the
senior military officials deliberately lie about the existence of information); Jean Laroche, Nova Scotia
Premier Phones Staff to Keep Information Secret, CBC (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.cbc.ca/news/cana
da/nova-scotia/information-foipop-access-secrecy-premier-stephen-mcneil-1.3784110 (reporting that
the head of a Canadian province admitted he would avoid leaving a paper trail specifically so there was
nothing for the public to access).
235
See supra notes 223–229 and accompanying text.
236
See supra Part II.
237
Indeed, many information commissions coexist with these other forms of remedies. See, e.g.,
Lei No. 12.527, de 18 de Novembro de 2011, Diáeio Oficial da União [D.O.U.] de 18.11.2011, § II, arts.
15, 16, 35 (Braz.); The Right to Information Act, 2005, §§ 18(3), 19(7) (India); Public Information
Disclosure Act, Act No. 14 of 2008, arts. 4(4), 26(1), 37(1) (Indon.). Each of these statutes allow for both
administrative remedies and judicial appeals.
238
VIKAS JHA, ACCESSING INFORMATION UNDER RTI: CITIZENS’ EXPERIENCES IN TEN STATES 2008 53 (2008), https://pria.org/knowledge_resource/Accessing_Information_Under_RTI_1.pdf.
239
Neuman, supra note 145, at 6–7.
240
See Wilbur v. CIA, 355 F.3d 675, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (detailing exhaustion requirements for
FOIA).
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executive. It is housed with NARA, an executive agency.
Although
Congress may have arranged this structure on the understanding that NARA
was a relatively neutral, relatively expertise-driven agency concerned with
records preservation and access, it is nonetheless subject to presidential
control, housed within the executive, and otherwise part of the political
administration.242 Indeed, its overlapping responsibilities with OIP, a
division of DOJ, make clear that it is a political entity. NARA itself does not
even have the status of so-called independent agencies,243 which are headed
by multi-member bodies or commissions populated by officials who are
protected from presidential control through for-cause removal provisions.244
The value of independent administrative review can be seen in light of
the experiences of journalists detailed earlier in Part II. When they can obtain
independent review, it is powerful, but too often that review is inaccessible.
The United States should learn from the experiences of other legal regimes
and create a truly independent oversight body.
B. Order Making Power
A second critical element of institutional design for oversight is vesting
order-making power in the independent body. The power to issue binding
orders—orders to release information with which agencies must comply—is
the remedy that requesters need when they face agency recalcitrance and
denial of records. It is the authority of a court to order compliance that makes
judicial review so powerful for those who can access it, as described in detail
in Part II. And only an oversight body that has that power will be able to
remedy violations of the law.
The current dissatisfaction with OGIS is illustrative, insofar as the
central problem is that OGIS does not possess order making power. As one
advocacy organization that is a frequent FOIA plaintiff described, OGIS’s
characterization of the success of its “team approach” in collaborating with
agencies to respond to FOIA requests “is laughable.”245 Another
transparency organization documented how federal agencies can and have
241

See supra Part II.C.
Nicolas E.M. Michiels, Comment, Should Inmates Be Running the Jailhouse?: Affirming the
Constitutionality of Enhanced Archivist Involvement in White House Record-Keeping Policymaking, 58
AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1592 (2009) (“Even if it is argued that granting the Archivist the authority to issue
standards and certify presidential implementation is an impermissible transfer of control away from the
White House, the EMPA would have passed constitutional muster under Nixon II because the Archivist
is effectively an executive branch official. The Archivist is the head of the NARA, an administrative
entity that is popularly referred to as an independent agency. However, NARA does not possess the
traditional characteristics of an independent agency; instead, the structure of NARA resembles that of a
more traditional executive branch agency.”) (footnotes omitted).
243
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ignored OGIS’s attempt to mediate disputes, with little to no recourse
available to OGIS.246
OGIS’s lack of enforcement powers may also be the reason why it so
rarely avails itself of the recommendation-making power that it currently
has.247 The current OGIS structure may actually encourage the agency to
pull its punches. If, for example, an appeal was lodged concerning a
document which the oversight body believed should be disclosed in its
entirety, but which they knew the agency would never voluntarily release,
there is little incentive for the oversight body to engage on the question and
risk polluting their future interactions with the agency. This is in addition to
the broadly demoralizing impact of undertaking a review that staffers know
will ultimately result in no substantive changes. The lack of OGIS follow-up
in the face of non-compliance itself encourages officials to continue ignoring
their obligations under the Act.
It is also eminently sensible from a design perspective to give an
independent information commission or oversight body order-making
power. To begin, a specialized information commission or commissioner
will be able to develop a strong level of expertise in the right to information
and in the appropriate secrecy standards for concepts like national security
and commercial confidentiality.248 This expertise should allow the
commission to assess the potential harm flowing from disclosures with a
higher degree of accuracy.
Second, it is a significant public investment to create a specialized
information commission. Where countries are going to devote the resources
necessary to establishing this office, they may want to get the most bang for
their buck in terms of robust oversight in order to deliver on the perceived
benefits of a healthy transparency system.249 It does not make sense to devote
substantial resources to establishing a dedicated office specializing in the right
to information, only to allow public officials to ignore the opinions that flow
from the office whenever they might be inconvenient. Both factors may
undermine the efficacy of more collaborative, recommendation-based systems.
Order-making power for oversight bodies is more controversial than
independence, but the experience of countries that have adopted a strong
order-making power model demonstrates the system’s efficacy.250 First, in
246
Alex Howard, The Interior Department Should Honor Congress’ Intentions on FOIA Mediation,
SUNLIGHT FOUND. (May 19, 2016, 2:15 PM), https://sunlightfoundation.com/2016/05/19/the-interiordepartment-should-honor-congress-intentions-on-foia-mediation/.
247
See supra Part II.C.
248
See, e.g., Section 21: Advice and Recommendations, INFO. COMM’R OF CAN., https://www.oicci.gc.ca/en/investigators-guide-interpreting-act/section-21_advice-and-recommendations (Sept. 30, 2019)
(demonstrating the detailed level of analysis, including through relevant case law and specific examples,
applied by Canada’s Information Commissioner to the exception for deliberative processes).
249
See supra Part I.
250
See supra Part III.
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general, the systems that have been widely celebrated as global success
stories tend to follow an order-making model. The prototypical example here
is India, which is often pointed to as exemplifying the potential
transformative impact of a strong right-to-information law.251 Mexico252 and
the United Kingdom,253 two other countries that are often pointed to as
“success stories,” likewise equip their oversight bodies with robust
enforcement powers.254
By contrast, the international trend is that those countries that employ
multi-purpose oversight bodies, rather than dedicated information
commissions, tend to be limited to offering recommendations.255 There are
several reasons which may explain this distinction. First, an ombudsman or
a human rights commission, which deals with a more general portfolio, is
unlikely to cultivate the same level of specific expertise.256 This may lead to
less confidence that it will make the right call in balancing the public interest
in disclosure against the potential harms. Second, there may be less
investment of resources when adding transparency oversight responsibilities
to an existing oversight body than when creating a stand-alone information
commission. As such, the international trend supports order-making power
for dedicated information commission models.
Moreover, the main purported advantage of a recommendation-based
model, is, upon close examination, illusory. Proponents suggest that
recommendation-based models help to foster a more collaborative and less
adversarial approach to promoting disclosure.257 The experience with OGIS,
however, shows the weakness of this approach.
In fact, to the contrary, at the international level, there is no shortage of
examples of countries, like Indonesia, that merge order-making power with
251

ESHA SEN MADHAVAN, BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y AT HARV. UNIV., REVISITING
THE MAKING OF INDIA’S RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT: THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF A
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that this fundamental right has degraded significantly under the present Modi administration, consistent
with a broader erosion of civil and political rights in that country.
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ADMIN. RSCH. & THEORY 485, 485 (2017).
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258

a robust front-end mediation procedure. Indeed, stronger order-making
powers appear to support, rather than undermine, more robust mediation
efforts by strengthening the Information Commission’s hand in trying to
push governments to be more accommodating, given the implication that
their obduracy could work against them if the mediation process fails. This
was the sentiment that David Loukidelis, who was formerly British
Columbia’s Information and Privacy Commissioner, expressed when asked
about the strengths and weaknesses of an order-making system:
Speaking only to the situation and experience in British
Columbia, we have found, over the 16 years of our office’s
experience, that order-making power has served, in fact, to
encourage dispute resolution. Using mediation, we consistently
resolve some 85% to 90% of the access appeals that come to
our office.259
A survey of Canada’s information oversight bodies, some of which have
order-making power and some of which operate on a recommendations-based
approach, shows broad dissatisfaction with the latter.260 In addition to
boosting compliance through direct intervention, the utility of strong
enforcement powers to support more earnest participation in front-end
mediation processes, as well as claims that a stronger enforcement
mechanism would help to empower internal champions of transparency and
push government departments to direct more resources towards processing
information requests, are all worth flagging.261
C. An American Model of Oversight
While global experiences are useful in making the case for why
independent administrative oversight structures would be beneficial to
promoting compliance with FOIA, policy-makers need not view these
reforms as a wholly foreign concept. First, order-making power in an
independent commission or oversight body model is entirely consistent with
non-Article III adjudication authority vested for the administrative

258
Public Information Disclosure Act, Act No. 14 of 2008, ch. 8, arts. 38-39 & ch. 9, arts. 40-41
(Indon.).
259
Paul Szabo, Chair, House of Commons, The Access to Information Act: First Steps Towards
Renewal, Report of the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, 40th Parl.,
2d Sess., at 6 (2009).
260
OFF. OF THE INFO. & PRIV. COMM’R FOR NOVA SCOTIA, 2017–2018 ANNUAL REPORT 7, 30
(2018), https://oipc.novascotia.ca/sites/default/files/publications/annual-reports/OIPC%202017-2018%
20Annual%20Report_0.pdf; Failing to Strike the Right Balance for Transparency, supra note 191.
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OFF. OF THE INFO. & PRIV. COMM’R FOR NOVA SCOTIA, supra note 260, at 7, 30; Failing to
Strike the Right Balance for Transparency, supra note 191.
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262

adjudication of so-called public rights.
Indeed, information access
decisions would form classic public rights cases, where the government is
a party to the dispute and the rights at issue were created by federal
statute.263 It is a natural fit for a non-Article III body to adjudicate these
rights in the first instance, one with expertise and independence as its sources
of legitimacy.
However, the strongest case for how these structures can be effective in
an American context lies at the state level, where several such bodies already
exist. Connecticut,264 New Jersey,265 New York,266 Indiana,267 and Utah268
all have established specialized administrative oversight bodies to process
complaints related to their local freedom of information legislation. Of these,
Connecticut’s Freedom of Information Commission, Utah’s State Records
Committee, and New Jersey’s Government Records Council all have the
power to order disclosure of records, though the latter appears to rarely
exercise this power.269 Indiana’s Public Access Counselor, by contrast,
issues advisory opinions, as does New York’s Committee on Open
Government.270 A number of states delegate the power to review appeals to
an ombudsman, namely Iowa,271 Arizona,272 Tennessee,273 and Virginia,274
though the ombudsmen typically do not have the power to overrule refusals
of access.

262
See William Baude, Adjudication Outside Article III, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1542–45 (2020)
(explaining the public rights doctrine).
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That some U.S. states have successfully adopted independent oversight
models with order-making authority speaks to the feasibility of such systems in
the U.S. political and legal context. Indeed, Connecticut’s model is hailed as a
particularly successful one, and it has regularly contested case hearings, issues
decisions, and testifies on policy matters before the Connecticut legislature.275
In other words, the weakness and inefficacy of the OGIS is by no means
a necessary consequence of the American system. Rather, it is an area of
national weakness that exists because, at the federal level, Congress has
implemented solutions that are not fit for purpose, at the cost of its own
oversight and the public interest in this critical democratic right. Amid broader
conversations about the need for democratic revival and, above all else, a drive
to impose accountability against the demonstrated excesses of the executive
branch, a revitalized FOIA system should be a central ingredient in restoring
faith and confidence in America’s democratic processes.
CONCLUSION
America’s system of democratic checks and balances is in the midst of
a profound political crisis.276 While the most dramatic manifestation of this
came in the form of a physical attack on the U.S. Capitol,277 the past five
years have witnessed escalating challenges to congressional, and ultimately
public, oversight of the executive.278 The shift away from accountability
took place against a backdrop of mounting evidence of abuses across the
executive branch, including among administrative state agencies.279 In the
aftermath of this jarring stress-test of America’s democratic institutions,
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scholars and legal commentators are increasingly focused on questions of
democratic and constitutional renewal.280
Concerns about accountability and oversight of executive branch
institutions are nothing new, and they have indeed been a recurring feature of
academic, judicial, and political debate.281 Although recent abuses have
crystalized the dangers inherent in unchecked executive power, there is a
natural concern over the vast authority wielded by unelected government
officials, which extends to rulemaking and adjudication across a huge variety
of substantive areas.282 The fact that these officials are not directly answerable
to the electorate fuels a democratic deficit, which, in turn, drives a need for
alternative ways of imposing accountability on executive structures.283
If this is indeed the case, one might hope that the experience of the past
few years is enough to convince Americans, and particularly America’s
legislators, that now is the time to finally take decisive steps to bring FOIA
into the twenty-first century, particularly through an oversight structure that
guarantees agencies follow the law.
Over the past few years, Benjamin Franklin’s (possibly apocryphal)
rejoinder that the Founding Fathers had designed “a republic, if you can keep
it,” has grown quite popular, particularly among congressional leaders.284
But, while the line was a frequent reference point in the 2019 impeachment
process, its underlying message on the need for vigilance to maintain
America’s democratic institutions is equally appropriate in the context of
legislative solutions to impose broad structural oversight over the exercise of
administrative power. Though not as flashy as a vote for impeachment, these
institutional changes are a more important ingredient in the broader project of
rejuvenating American democracy and developing a model of robust
oversight which can not only expose abuses from the previous President, but
also support accountability for future inhabitants of the Oval Office.
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